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ABSTRACT: Public policy is one of the most well-known and important institutions of private 
international law. It can be found as grounds for refusal for recognition and enforcement in several 
European Regulations, among others also in the Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes and Council Regulation (EU) 
2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law 
and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered 
partnerships, together named as Twin Regulations. They namely both determine that a decision shall not 
be recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member 
State in which recognition is sought. The article studies the features of grounds of public policy and 
emphasises	the	related	problems	that	are	specific	in	the	context	of	the	Twin	Regulations.
KEY WORDS: Procedural public policy; public policy, Regulation 2016/1103, Regulation 2016/1104, 
substantive public policy, twin Regulations.
RESUMEN: El orden público es una de las instituciones más conocidas e importantes del Derecho internacional 
privado. Puede encontrarse como motivo de denegación de reconocimiento y ejecución en varios Reglamentos 
europeos, entre otros en el Reglamento (UE) 2016/1103 del Consejo, de 24 de junio de 2016, por el que se 
establece una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito de la competencia, la ley aplicable y el reconocimiento y 
la ejecución de las resoluciones en materia de regímenes económico matrimoniales, y en el Reglamento (UE) 
2016/1104 del Consejo, de 24 de junio de 2016, por el que se establece una cooperación reforzada en el ámbito 
de la competencia, la ley aplicable y el reconocimiento y la ejecución de las resoluciones en materia de efectos 
patrimoniales de las uniones registradas, denominados conjuntamente “Reglamentos Gemelos”. En concreto, 
ambos determinan que no se reconocerá una resolución si dicho reconocimiento es manifiestamente contrario al 
orden público del Estado miembro en el que se solicita el reconocimiento. El artículo estudia las características 
de los motivos de orden público y hace hincapié en los problemas relacionados que son específicos en el contexto 
de los “Reglamentos Gemelos”.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Proceso de orden público; orden público; Reglamento 2016/1103, Reglamento 2016/1104; 
orden público sustantivo, Reglamentos Gemelos.
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I. BACKGROUND.
Public policy is one of the most well-known and important institutions of private 
international law. Such was and still is a way for individual countries to safeguard 
their own values, principles, and rules that comprise the foundations of their legal 
system. With the adoption of international and European legal documents on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign court decisions, countries are exposed 
to the possible invasion of unknown foreign values that are different than their 
own. The cross-border flow of foreign decisions is generally possible, however 
not unrestrained. Public policy offers suitable protection and is historically and 
traditionally grounds for the refusal of recognition and enforcement in national 
private international rules. Nowadays, it can be found as grounds for refusal also 
in European regulations providing for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
court decisions. The only attempt to remove such an obstructing rule was at 
the time of the drafting of the recast of Council Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001 
of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter: Regulation 44/2001)1. 
Reviewing public policy (at least the substantive part thereof) when dealing with 
foreign decisions was not deemed to be in line with the European process of 
integration2. There was the idea that public policy as grounds for non-recognition 
and non-enforcement should be narrowed to only procedural public policy3. It was 
deemed to be a perfect opportunity to do that. It was the recast of a regulation 
that was well known by that time and often used in the Member States of the 
European Union (hereinafter: the EU). Additionally, the EU Member States already 
had (and still have) in some fields legal regulations that are partially unified and 
harmonised with the EU legal sources, as well as otherwise similar substantive 
law arrangements, and finally also have a similar historical and geographical 
background. It is possible to conclude that because of all these circumstances, the 
substantive public policies of these states are more or less similar if not the same. 
1 OJ L 12, 16th January 2001.
2 KeresteŠ, T.: “Public Policy in Brussels Regulation I: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”, Lexonomica, 2016, 8, 
no. 2, p. 82.
3 KramBerGer Škerl, J.: “Predlog spremembe uredbe Bruselj I”, Pravna praksa, 2011, no. 4, p. 17.
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This can be seen also in the small number of court decisions in which the courts of 
the EU Member States have refused the recognition or enforcement of a foreign 
court decision when using Regulation 44/2001 due to the public policy exception. 
An opportunity to narrow this exception was therefore appropriate, however the 
European Commission did not succeed with such a proposal4.
The public policy exception therefore also appears in European regulations 
adopted subsequently5. Among these are also Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 
of 24th June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, 
applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of 
matrimonial property regimes6 (hereinafter: Regulation 2016/1103) and Council 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation 
in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships7 
(hereinafter: Regulation 2016/1104), which are together referred to as the Twin 
Regulations. These two regulations provide for literally the same grounds for 
refusal of recognition8 and enforcement as Regulation (EU) no. 1215/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12th December 2012 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters9 
(hereinafter: Recognition 1215/2012), on one hand, and other regulations in the 
field of family law, on the other. See Council Regulation (EC) no. 2201/2003 of 
27th November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, 
repealing Regulation (EC) no. 1347/2000 (hereinafter: Regulation 2201/2003)10, 
its recast Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters 
of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (hereinafter: 
Regulation 2019/1111)11, and finally also Regulation (EU) no. 650/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable 
4 EU Member States opposed such a proposal and the exequatur procedure was instead removed.
5 It is different in EU regulations that provide for special instruments and different manners of their cross-
border lives. See, for example, Regulation (EC) no. 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21th April 2004 creating a European enforcement order for uncontested claims [2004] OJ of 
the European Union L 143, Regulation (EC) no. 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11th July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure [2007] OJ of the European Union L 1991/1, 
and Regulation (EC) no. 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12th December 2006 
creating a European order for payment procedure [2006] OJ of the European Union L 399/1.
6 OJ L 183, 8th July 2016.
7 OJ L 183, 8th July 2016.
8 Hereinafter, I will only use the term grounds for refusal of recognition. The names of the Twin Regulations 
include the term “enforcement”, while the text thereof provides for the procedure for the declaration of 
enforceability. When contesting such a declaration, the party can use the same grounds that are otherwise 
provided for refusal of recognition (see Articles 51 and 37 of the Twin Regulations).
9 OJ L 351, 20th December 2012. 
10 OJ L 338, 23th December 2003.
11 OJ L 178, 2th July 2019.
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law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of 
authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European 
Certificate of Succession12. Regardless of the fact that the concept of public 
policy has not changed since the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and 
the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters13 (hereinafter: the 
Brussels Convention)14, it is possible to conclude that the term has at least a slightly 
different meaning in the Twin Regulations.
II. CONTENT OF PUBLIC POLICY.
Article 37 of both Regulation 2016/1103 and Regulation 2016/1104 regarding 
public policy are the same: “A decision shall not be recognised: (a) if such 
recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member 
State in which recognition is sought”15. Compared to the leading EU regulations 
on civil and commercial law, the provisions in the Twin Regulations are stylistically 
the same as in Regulation 44/2001 (Article 34) and its predecessor, the Brussels 
Convention (Article 34). The main difference16 is the use of the term “judgment” 
in Regulation 44/2001 and the Brussels Convention and the different use of the 
term “decision” in the Twin Regulations. The reason for such divergence is clear. 
The Twin Regulations can namely also apply to decisions by other bodies (for 
example, notaries public), not just courts.
As can be seen, the Twin Regulations, the same as other European regulations, 
do not provide a definition of public policy, also referred to as international public 
policy. They do not regulate the content thereof and the manner of its application. 
The EU therefore leaves it up to the Member State to apply it on their own. 
Consequently, the Member States interpret and apply the term determined in EU 
legal sources in the same manner as they do within their national legal systems. 
However, also national legislation generally does not provide for a definition of 
public policy. Broad interpretations of the term have only therefore been formed 
in legal theory and case law. A general explanation could be that public policy 
12 OJ L 201/107, 27th July 2012.
13 OJ L 299, 31th December 1972.
14 MaGnus, U., MankoWski, P.: European Commentaries on Private International Law, ECPIL, Commentary, Brussels 
I bis Regulation, Volume I, Cologne, 2016, p. 878. The only visible difference in the relevant provision of 
Regulation 44/2001 compared to the Brussels Convention is the addition of the adjective “manifestly”. 
From then on, all of the relevant EU regulations require effects that are manifestly contrary to public policy. 
The change was aimed at narrowing the exception and lowering the possibilities for refusal of recognition 
and enforcement; however it did not have an evident effect in practise. For more on this, see MaGnus, 
U. and MankoWski, P.: European Commentaries, cit., p. 881 and CuniBerti, G.: “Article 37 Grounds of non-
recognition”, in ViarenGo, I. and Franzina, P. (ed.): The Regulations on the Property Regimes of International 
Couples, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2020, p. 347.
15 The wording of the provision is completely the same also in Article 40 of Regulation 655/2012.
16	 Another	insignificant	difference	is	the	use	of	the	term	ordre public in the English version of the text. It is 
the French term for “public policy”. Such an additional name for the same term was not used in Regulation 
44/2001, but appears in all subsequent regulations.
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is “a set of values on which the legal, social and cultural order of an individual 
state is based and which must (also) be respected in so-called relations with an 
international element”17. Not all national mandatory rules are considered to be 
part of public policy18, but only the most important ones, regarding which it is 
sensible that they are used in international matters19. The principles and rules 
protected by public policy are the ones that are more fundamental than those that 
are protected with overriding mandatory provisions20. Due to its ambiguity, doubt 
exists regarding the moral principles as a part of public policy21. This dilemma can 
be attributed mostly to the openness and indefinableness of the term morality 
itself. However, a general instruction of the CJEU for the Member States regarding 
public policy is to consider whether the recognition of a foreign decision “would 
be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which 
enforcement is sought inasmuch as it would infringe a fundamental principle” and 
that “the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law 
regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought 
or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order”22.
Public policy is therefore a national thing and depends on the national law. The 
term can therefore differ from country to country, with each of them protecting 
their fundamental rules, principles, and values. It evolves over time and necessarily 
also with the social and legal changes in an individual country. Its content is not 
clear and definite all the time, but is determined only in concrete cases – when 
considering whether a specific foreign decision (or the recognition thereof) is 
contrary to public policy. Due to the uncertainties accompanying this mental 
process, proposals to make it more predictable can be found in legal theory. Gössl 
proposes that a way of determining whether or how the public policy exception 
applies in a specific case should be more coherent among the EU Member States23. 
As an advantage of such a harmonised approach, she sees a higher level of certainty 
for the parties that are involved in a specific case. While this could certainly be a 
positive outcome, in my opinion it does not outweigh the challenges and obstacles 
17 KramBerGer Škerl, J.: “Evropeizacija javnega reda v mednarodnem zasebnem pravu”, Pravni letopis, 2008, p. 
349.
18	 The	Slovenian	Supreme	Court	has	confirmed	this	several	times	when	deciding	on	the	recognition	of	foreign	
court decisions, using a different legal rule regarding statutory interest than that which applies in Slovenia. 
The Slovenian provision regarding statutory interest is ius cogens. Not all violations of ius cogens legal rules 
are also violations of public policy. A provision regarding statutory interest is ius cogens within the country; 
however, it is not so fundamental and essential that its violation would lead to the refusal of recognition. 
See Cpg 7/2016, 15th July 2016, and Cp 1/2016, 11th February 2016.
19 KeresteŠ, T.: “Public Policy”, cit., p. 79.
20 BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B.: The EU Regulations on Matrimonial 
and Patrimonial Property, Oxford, 2019, p. 153.
21 KeresteŠ, T.: “Public Policy”, cit., p. 79.
22	 Case	C302/13,	flyLAL-Lithuanian	Airlines	AS,	in	liquidation,	v	Starptautiskā	lidosta	Rāga	VAS,	Air	Baltic	
Corporation AS, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2319, para. 49.
23 Gössl, S. L.: “The public policy exception in the European civil justice system”, The European Legal Forum, 
2016, no. 4, p. 92.
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that would come about with the attempt to design criteria as regards how to 
consider and decide on the public policy exception.
While the EU has let Member States autonomously interpret and apply the 
public policy exception, as is determined in EU regulations, they are nevertheless 
not completely free. Beside the “national” part of public policy, national judges 
must also consider another aspect. Countries that are Member States of the EU or 
the Council of Europe are obliged to respect the values thereof24. These represent 
the so-called European part of public policy, or European public policy25. This part 
of public policy should not be interpreted freely by individual countries. Countries 
are bound to the interpretations of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereinafter: the CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: 
the ECtHR). Because of that, it is not to be expected that there will be divergences 
in the understanding and interpretation of European public policy among different 
Member States. The CJEU has indirectly confirmed in its case law that within the 
public policy exception national law and Community law are equivalent26. The 
court of recognition must therefore inspect also whether the recognition of a 
specific decision would be contrary to the fundamental principles and rights of 
EU law27.
The application of the public policy exception of the Twin Regulations therefore 
derives from the national concept of the public policy; however, it is mandatory 
to respect the limits set by the CJEU in its decisions28. For a national court to 
be able to apply the public policy exception it is necessary to provide extensive 
argumentation on why certain values constitute a (national) public policy. If 
confronted with a specific case, the CJEU inspects whether such arguments are 
true, which contributes to the Europeanization of the public policy exception29.
As in other European regulations, also the Twin Regulations enable the public 
policy exception only in cases of manifest contrariety to public policy. This entails 
that “normal” and “average” contrarieties are not enough for the exception under 
Article 37(a) of the Twin Regulations to be used. This is deemed to hold when 
the public policy of the Member State of recognition would be violated “to an 
24 Member States are therefore obliged to respect fundamental principles of the EU. However, it is not 
possible to say that European public policy includes all European legal sources, despite the fact that EU 
law is hierarchically above the national. KramBerGer Škerl, J.: “Javni red pri priznanju in izvršitvi tujih sodnih 
odločb”, Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, 2005, pp. 5-6.
25 KramBerGer Škerl, J., “Evropeizacija javnega”, cit., p. 352, distinguishes between two parts of European 
public policy. These are Community public policy, which includes European Union values, and Convention 
public policy, which includes the values of the Council of Europe.
26 Case C-38/98, Renault SA v Maxicar SpA and Orazio Formento, ECLI:EU:C:2000:225. See MaGnus, U. and 
MankoWski, P.: European Commentaries, cit., p. 886-887.
27 C-681/13, Diageo Brands BV v Simiramida-04 EOOD, ECLI:EU:C:2015:471, paras. 50–51.
28 MaGnus, U. and MankoWski, P.: European Commentaries, cit., p. 878.
29 Gössl, S. L.: “The public policy”, cit., pp. 87, 89.
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unacceptable degree”30. Only violations of certain severity are relevant. The court 
may refuse recognition in the case of violations that cannot be tolerated under any 
circumstances31. However, some opine that such a requirement would entail the 
need for a thorough investigation of a specific decision and the procedure for its 
issuance, which is not appropriate32. According to legal theory, consideration of 
such gravity depends on the existence of a close and significant link between the 
specific case and the Member State addressed33. Such a link can, for example, be 
the nationality or citizenship of one of the parties in the relevant Member State. 
The closer the link, the easier and more often the recognition of a foreign decision 
might violate the public policy34. The application of such a link undoubtedly leads 
to different outcomes of the decision on refusal in different Member States even if 
identical content as to the term public policy is applied in all of them35. While national 
jurisdictions often require and apply such a link36, neither the Twin Regulations nor 
any other European regulations regulating recognition and enforcement explicitly 
mention it. It is possible to conclude that it is therefore not relevant when applying 
the public policy exception within these regulations37. 
As public policy as a ground for non-recognition and non-enforcement has 
found a place in several European regulations, in the past the CJEU has decided 
to interpret this term in many cases. Because the same term is also used in 
Regulation 2016/1103 and Regulation 2016/1104, CJEU decisions can and should 
be used reasonably also when interpreting Article 37(a) of the Twin Regulations38. 
However, subsidiary and reasonable application of the CJEU decision regarding 
substantive public policy to the Twin Regulations will not always be appropriate.
30 BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B: The EU Regulations, cit., p. 153.
31 PamBoukis, H. P.: EU Succession Regulation No 650/2012: A Commentary, Oxford, 2017, p. 455.
32 CuniBerti, G.: “Article 37 Grounds of non-recognition”, in viarenGo, I. and Franzina, P. (ed.): The Regulations 
on the Property Regimes of International Couples, Cheltenham, 2020, p. 347.
33 CuniBerti, G.: “Article 37”, cit., p. 348; MaGnus, U. and MankoWski, P.: European Commentaries, cit., p. 882; 
Gössl, S. L.: “The public policy”, cit., p. 90. 
34 MaGnus, U. and MankoWski, P.: European Commentaries, cit., p. 882. Gössl, S. L.: “The public policy”, cit., 
p. 90, emphasises that when a “right of a considerable interest” is involved, the link between the case and 
the court is less important. Gössl, S. L., “The public policy”, cit., p. 90, emphasises that in cases of unequal 
treatment	between	men	and	women,	the	opinion	exists	that	a	link	between	the	court	and	the	specific	case	
is not mandatory.
35 Gössl, S. L.: “The public policy”, cit., p. 90. She emphasises that nevertheless it is not to be expected that 
the courts will refuse the application of a public policy exception due to the non-existence of a link to the 
case. A minimum link can namely be established with the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court, which 
already requires a certain link to the forum.
36 See BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B.: The EU Regulations, cit., p. 153; 
Gössl, S. L.: “The public policy”, cit., p. 90.
37 CuniBerti, G.: “Article 37”, cit., p. 348.
38 CuniBerti, G., “Article 37”, cit., p. 346.
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1. Substantive public policy.
The Twin Regulations regulate a specific field of law that is in many aspects 
different than traditional civil and commercial matters. A substantive public policy 
exception as grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement was not really used 
in case law under the Brussels Convention, Regulation 44/2001, and Regulation 
1215/201239. The reason is that substantive national legislation in the field of civil 
and commercial law is partially harmonised and unified, and public policy related to 
these fields is more or less the same in different EU Member States. However, this 
is not also true for the field of family law. Furthermore, it is a very sensitive matter. 
Due to the different cultures, religions, and the development of societies, even 
European countries (let alone third countries) have different regulations regarding 
the institutions of marriage and registered partnership. Therefore, there is a 
greater chance of finding a national rule, the result of which would be considered 
to be contrary to public policy in the Member State of recognition (e.g. favouring 
a male spouse or a partner above his female spouse or partner when dividing 
their property). This is especially true due to the particularly sensitive questions 
that accompany these matters (e.g. the status of same-sex couples, same-sex 
marriage, and the registration of a heterosexual partnership). However, when a 
specific court ponders arguments regarding the manifest contrariety of a foreign 
decision to the public policy of lex fori, it may under no circumstances review a 
decision40 as to its substance (Article 40 of Regulation 2016/1103 and Regulation 
2016/1104). This rule severely limits a court’s possibility to consider the effects of 
the recognition of a decision and the contradiction thereof with the substantive 
public policy41. Every Member State must therefore assume the standpoint that EU 
Member States correctly apply in the specific case the applicable national law and 
EU law. The opposite option would ruin mutual trust, which is the foundation of 
the successful regime of the cross-border recognition of foreign decisions.
The court, therefore, must not audit either the findings of facts or the 
application of substantive law42. The wrong application of a substantive law is not 
a reason for the application of the public policy exception43. Neither is the belief 
that the court (of recognition) would have reached a different decision on the 
39 When a public policy exception was applied, it was mostly due to procedural violations.
40 Article 36 of Regulation 44/2001 and Article 52 of Regulation 1215/2012 contain a similar provision. 
Interestingly,	these	regulations	regarding	the	cross-border	enforcement	of	decisions	in	the	field	of	civil	and	
commercial law prohibit a merely substantive review of the judgment, but not the certificate. Consequently, 
the	information	in	the	certificate	may	be	subject	to	a	review	in	the	state	in	which	recognition	is	sought.	
PamBoukis, H. P.: EU Succession Regulation, cit., p. 465, and BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., 
LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B.: The EU Regulations, cit., p. 177.
41 MaGnus, U. and MankoWski, P.: European Commentaries, cit., p. 883.
42 In Decision Cpg 8/2019, 24th	September	2019,	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	Republic	of	Slovenia	confirmed	
that	 the	 (possible)	wrong	application	of	national,	EU,	or	 international	 law	when	 issuing	a	specific	court	
decision is not a ground for refusing recognition.
43 Case C-38/98, Renault SA v Maxicar SpA and Orazio Formento, ECLI:EU:C:2000:225, para. 29
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merits if it had decided on the specific case on its own44. Additionally, the fact 
that in the specific case the applied substantive law is different than the lex fori is 
not a reason to apply the public policy exception45. When deciding on the public 
policy exception, the court therefore only needs to take into account the effects 
that would result from the recognition of a specific foreign decision. The only 
relevant question is therefore whether such effects would be (manifestly) contrary 
to public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought. 
The chances of a substantive public policy exception applying in a specific case 
are rather low also due to the impact of the provision of Article 31 of the Twin 
Regulations (in the English version) named “Public policy (ordre public)”. This is a 
provision in the chapter on applicable law that determines that the application of a 
provision of the law of any state specified by the Twin Regulations may be refused 
if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum46. 
The court of origin can therefore refuse the application of a foreign legal provision 
if the effects of the application of such are contrary to public policy. This weighing 
differs from the one determined in Article 37 (a) of the Twin Regulations. While 
the court of origin decides whether the application of a specific provision would 
be contrary to public policy, the court of recognition examines only whether the 
effects of the recognition of a specific foreign decision (and not its content) would 
be contrary to public policy. Regarding the latter, it is not relevant even if an 
applied foreign law itself is contrary to public policy. What is decisive is only what 
the effects of the recognition of such foreign decision are. Bergquist and Cuniberti 
give the example of polygamous marriages47. While a Member State would not 
apply a foreign law allowing such a marriage due to it contradicting public policy, 
the same Member State might recognise a foreign court decision using such a law, 
because its effects (the division of assets) are not contrary to the public policy48. 
This is the so-called “attenuated” effect of public policy (in French, effet atténué, 
in German, abgeschwächte Wirkung des ordre public), which protects the already 
acquired rights of the parties49.
44 BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B.: The EU Regulations, cit., p. 205.
45 BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B.: The EU Regulations, cit., p. 153-
154. The CJEU ruled in C-7/98, Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski, ECLI:EU:C:2000:164, para. 36, that 
the difference in legislation is not a violation of the public policy of the Member State of recognition and 
enforcement.
46 The provision is not an exception. It can also be found in other EU regulations. See, for example, Article 35 
of Regulation 655/2012.
47 BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B.: The EU Regulations, cit., p. 154, and 
CuniBerti, G.: “Article 37”, cit., p. 347–348.
48 The same principle can be found in the Slovenian Supreme Court case II Ips 462/2009, 28th January 2000. 
The Slovenian court was deciding on the recognition of a court decision issued in the USA, regarding the 
adoption of a child by a same-sex couple. The court decided that the recognition of such decision is not 
contrary to public policy and therefore recognised it, even if Slovenian substantive law would not allow for 
such adoption. For more, see KramBerGer Škerl,	J.:	“Nerazumevanje	pridržka	javnega	reda	in	posvojitev	s	
strani istospolnih partnerjev”, Pravna Praksa, 2010, nos. 29-30, p. 26 ff.
49 For more on this, see KramBerGer Škerl, J., “Javni red”, cit., p. 5-6.
Actualidad Jurídica Iberoamericana Nº 15, agosto 2021, ISSN: 2386-4567, pp. 308-323
[318]
Both provisions that include the institution of public policy use the same level of 
seriousness. Article 31 of the Twin Regulations requires a manifest incompatibility 
and Article 37(a) of the Twin Regulations requires manifest contrariety. Despite 
the impression that the level of gravity is the same, legal theory emphasises that 
public order as an exception to recognition must be applied more strictly50. 
Consequently, it is easier to refuse the application of a foreign legal rule than 
to refuse recognition of a foreign decision. Such a first review of the possible 
violations of the public policy of the Member State of origin at the stage of the 
application of a foreign law lowers the chance that the recognition of a foreign 
decision would subsequently have manifestly contrary effects on the public policy 
of the Member State of recognition.
2. Procedural public policy.
Besides substantive public policy, there is also procedural public policy, which 
together form general public policy under Article 37(a) of the Twin Regulations. 
It includes “those fundamental principles and institutes of civil procedure without 
which there can be no democratic court procedure or rule of law.”51 However, 
national legislation is not the only source of procedural rules. It is necessary to also 
respect the ECHR (especially Article 6) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (hereinafter: the Charter) (especially Article 47). The right to 
a fair trial therefore binds several countries and is a foundation for all EU Member 
States. Consequently, it is unquestionably a part of procedural public policy, which 
the Member States participating in the enhanced cooperation need to take into 
account when considering refusing recognition due to the public policy exception.
However, not all of the procedural mistakes made in the procedure for issuing 
the decision are enough to apply the public policy exception. Only fundamental 
ones can have such a serious result. The court of recognition must consider the 
entire proceedings for issuing the specific decision.
Regardless of the fact that all European countries (and also some others) are 
bound by the ECHR and the Charter and are therefore obliged to respect them 
in national court procedures, a not insignificant extent of case law on refusals 
due to procedural public policy exceptions exists. When applying the Brussels 
Convention and Regulation 44/2001, the CJEU has already dealt with cases in 
which recognition was established to have effects contrary to public policy. These 
50 BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B.: The EU Regulations, cit., p. 153. 
BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B., The EU Regulations, cit., p. 156, 
attribute this to the fact that public policy in Article 31 of Regulation 2016/1103 and Regulation 2016/1104 
consists of only substantive public policy, while Article 37 (a) of Regulation 2016/1103 and Regulation 
2016/1104 also include procedural public policy.
51 KramBerGer Škerl, J., “Javni red”, cit., pp. 255.
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include: a case52 in which the defendant was prohibited from defending himself 
due to the fact that he did not physically appear at the court; a case53 involving the 
exclusion of the defendant from the proceedings because he had not respected 
a certain order of the court; and a case54 involving a judgment issued in default of 
appearance without giving either the reasoning of its merits or an assessment of 
the subject matter. The existence of violations of procedural fundamental rights 
that are serious enough to have effects contrary to public policy can lead to two 
conclusions. Either the countries disrespect the fundamental procedural rights in 
the national procedures despite their obligation to do so, or there are different 
interpretations in different countries of what the right to a fair trial means.
When talking about refusing recognition of a foreign decision due to a breach 
of procedural principles, the first thing to think about would not be the public 
policy exception. It would most likely be grounds to refuse recognition due to a 
decision issued in default of appearance (Article 37 (b) of the Twin Regulations). 
This can be the case if the defendant was not served the document that instituted 
the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a manner 
so as to enable him or her to arrange for his or her defence55. However, such a rule 
cannot be applied if the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge 
the decision when it was possible for him or her to do so. This is a narrower ground 
compared to public policy and is of a strictly procedural nature. If in a specific case 
a party’s procedural rights were violated, indent (b) is considered first. Indent (a) is 
considered only if such an exception cannot be applied56. The different grounds for 
refusal do not overlap57. Public policy therefore does not cover various violations 
that are covered by other indents of Article 37 of the Twin Regulations. The public 
policy exception is therefore a safety net for catching violations that do not entail 
other grounds for non-recognition but are contrary to public policy.
52 C-7/98, Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski, ECLI:EU:C:2000:164.
53 C-394/07, Marco Gambazzi v DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc. and CIBC Mellon Trust Company, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:219.
54 C619/10, Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2012:531.
55 KramBerGer Škerl, J.,“The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Slovenia; National Law and 
the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation”, Yearbook of Private International Law, 2018/2019, 20, p. 294, emphasises 
that the principle of contradiction is regulated as a special ground for non-recognition (and not as a part of 
public policy), “to emphasise its importance and eliminate every possible doubt that its violation could be 
the reason for the refusal of recognition and enforcement.”
56 The CJEU stressed the subsidiary nature of the public policy exception in case 145/86, Horst Ludwig 
Martin Hoffmann v Adelheid Krieg, ECLI:EU:C:1988:61, para. 21. MaGnus, U. and MankoWski, P., European 
Commentaries, cit., p. 882, emphasises that this is an application of the principle lex specialis derogate 
generalis.
57 MaGnus, U. and MankoWski, P.: European Commentaries, cit., p. 882.
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Generally, it is necessary to interpret the public policy exception strictly58, 
rigidly, and narrowly59. The mere fact that the national procedural law of the 
Member State of recognition is different than the national procedural law that was 
used when issuing a court decision is not a sufficient reason to apply the public 
policy exception60. The court of recognition must also not review the correctness 
of the application of the provisions on international jurisdiction under Regulation 
2016/1103 and Regulation 2016/110461. This is clearly determined in Article 39/
II of the Twin Regulations, whereas the provisions are slightly different. While 
both exclude a review of international jurisdiction under Articles 4–11, Regulation 
2016/1104 additionally excludes international jurisdiction for counterclaims under 
Article 12. An explanation for such a differentiation cannot be found in the possibly 
different legal arrangements of both regulations. The only option is therefore that 
the described difference is unintentional. Courts of recognition shall therefore not 
review the correctness of the application of any provisions of the Twin Regulations 
on international jurisdiction.
III. THE SPECIFICS OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE TWIN REGULATIONS.
As already mentioned, public policy has survived in more or less the same 
form since the Brussels Convention. Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude 
that the term has a slightly different value in the Twin Regulations. The principle 
of universal application (Article 20 of Twin Regulations) determines that a law 
designated as applicable by the rules of either of the Twin Regulations shall be 
applied whether or not it is the law of an EU Member State taking part in the 
enhanced cooperation. It is possible that the law of other EU Member States or 
of third countries is applied when issuing a specific decision. It is therefore realistic 
to expect that in some cases a legal system with completely different values (such 
as Sharia law) is applied62. Recognition of such a decision, although issued in one 
of the EU Member States that are bound by the Twin Regulations, can therefore 
cause a violation of the fundamental principles, values, or concepts of the Member 
State of recognition. In order to ensure better protection of the sensitive field 
that is the focus of the Twin Regulations, they explicitly require the observance of 
fundamental rights and principles.
58 The CJEU emphasised in case 145/86, Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v Adelheid Krieg, ECLI:EU:C:1988:61, 
that the public policy exception should only be applied in exceptional cases.
59 douGan, F.: “Nova evropska pravila o pristojnosti, pravu, ki se uporablja ter priznavanju in izvrševanju 
odločb na področju	premoženjskih	razmerij	mednarodnih	parov”,	in	GALIČ, A. and KramBerGer Škerl, J. 
(ed.): Liber amicorum Dragica Wedam Lukić, Ljubljana, 2019, p. 245.
60 Gössl, S. L.: “The public policy”, cit., p. 88.
61 The CJEU stated similar in the case C-7/98, Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski, ECLI:EU:C:2000:164, 
para. 32.
62 BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B.: The EU Regulations, cit., p. 153.
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This is the first time that a European regulation includes the obligation to 
respect the Charter in the text itself. In other regulations, such a rule can only be 
found among the Recitals (see, for example, Regulation 2201/2003 and Regulation 
2019/1111). When deciding on grounds for refusal of recognition, the courts and 
other competent authorities of the Member States shall therefore observe the 
fundamental rights and principles recognised in the Charter (Article 38 of the Twin 
Regulations). These are, for example, equality before the law (Article 20 of the 
Charter), equality between women and men (Article 23 of the Charter) and the 
right to property (Article 17 of the Charter). Among those, the Twin Regulations 
explicitly underline the principle of non-discrimination (Article 21 of the Charter), 
which reads “Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any 
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age 
or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. Within the scope of application of the 
Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination 
on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited”.
The subject matter of the Twin Regulations is the property consequences 
of marriage and registered partnerships. These include, inter alia, also matters 
involving the partition, distribution, or liquidation of the property, giving powers 
and rights regarding the property to each of the individuals in the couple, and the 
classification of the property of either or both of them into different categories. 
When dealing with these questions, there are numerous possibilities to discriminate 
against one spouse or partner based on any of the personal features mentioned 
in Article 21 of the Charter. While all of them are important, in my opinion two 
stand out in the Twin Regulations and have a greater possibility of being applied.
The first such personal feature is an individual’s sex. Taking into account the 
historical background and what is still a tradition in some societies, the tendency 
might exist to favour a male spouse or partner when deciding on property 
questions. Sharia law, for example, provides that 2/3 of spouses’ total assets go to 
the (ex-)husband and 1/3 to the (ex)wife63. If a Member State faces a court decision 
on dividing spouses’ assets using such a rule, it can refuse its recognition due to it 
contravening its public policy.
The second personal feature that is very likely to be grounds for discrimination 
considering the topic of the Twin Regulations is sexual orientation. It is not a 
secret that the Twin Regulations were adopted using a mechanism of enhanced 
cooperation due to the fear of some EU Member States that a foreign decision 
would acknowledge various forms of same-sex institutions. Depending on the 
national regulations, the Twin Regulations are also used for same-sex marriages 
63 BerGQuist, U., DamasCelli, D., Frimston, R., LaGarde, P. and Reinhartz, B.: The EU Regulations, cit., p. 221.
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and same-sex registered partnerships. Even if it is true that in such cases both 
individuals in the couple are the same sex and therefore discrimination between 
them on the basis of sexual orientation might not be a problem, the general 
principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is an important 
value in the Twin Regulations.
While the required observance of fundamental rights applies to all grounds for 
refusal listed in Article 37 of the Twin Regulations, it is evident that it is especially 
important for the public policy exception. Other grounds are regulated in more 
detail and the Twin Regulations themselves precisely determine when individual 
grounds exist. On the contrary, the ground of public policy is open and its content 
is not obvious only by reading the provision of Article 37 of the Twin Regulations. 
The help provided in the instructions in Article 38 is therefore welcome.
IV. INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION.
The declaration of the enforceability of decisions is automatic within the Twin 
Regulations (ipso iure) (Article 47). Therefore, there is no phase in which the court 
would consider any of the four grounds for non-recognition on its own motion. 
The party that opposes such automatic recognition must apply appropriate legal 
remedies, in which he or she must claim and prove the existence of a specific 
ground. Then an adversarial procedure begins (Article 49 of the Twin Regulations). 
When searching for possible grounds for refusal, a party and the competent court 
are limited to those listed in Article 37 of the Twin Regulations. The national 
legislation of Member States cannot provide for any other additional grounds for 
refusal64. If a court establishes that the effects of recognition would be contrary to 
public policy, it does not have discretion, but is obliged to refuse recognition. This 
is the so-called negative function of the public policy exception65.
Despite several academic articles on public policy in private international 
law, the court in each specific case is the one to decide on the content of such 
legal standard in the specific case. It has to interpret it strictly and with the 
acknowledgement that the (foreign) decision has already given specific rights 
and legal status to the party and therefore the refusal of the recognition and 
enforcement of such decision is a serious limitation and interference with his or 
her legal position.
64 Cazorla GonzÁlez, M. J., GioBBi, M., KramBerGer Škerl, J., RuGGeri, L. and Winkler, S. (ed.): Property relations 
of cross border couples in the European Union, Napoli, 2020, p. 136.
65 Gössl, S. L.: “The public policy”, cit., p. 86.
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